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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE'S INTEREST IN WILD
ANIMALS-Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
INTRODUCTION
The public owns about one-third of the land in the United
States primarily through the United States government in national
forests, national parks and the Bureau of Land Management; thus
the United States government is host to a substantial part of
America's wildlife.' Historically each state owns or has title to ani-
mals ferae naturae in trust for the citizens of the state.2 The
United States Supreme Court considered the question of owner-
ship of public game and fish resources in Geer v. Connecticut- and
decided that the control of wild animals lay in the colonial govern-
ments as vested by the English Crown. This power passed to the
states insofar as its exercise did not interfere with the rights of the
federal government granted under the Constitution. Geer upheld
a Connecticut statute which forbade the transportation of game
birds killed in Connecticut beyond the State boundaries by refus-
ing to recognize a violation of the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution. The Geer Court removed any transactions in-
volving wild game killed in Connecticut from interstate commerce.5
Gradually Geer has eroded. Subsequent cases have held that a
state's 'dominion over wildlife is not absolute. Hughes v.
Oklahoma6 confirms this modern trend by overruling Geer v. Con-
necticut and establishing that courts should consider challenges to
state regulations of wild animals under the commerce clause ac-
cording to the same general rule applied to state regulations of
other natural resources. Thus Hughes v. Oklahoma is an act of
clarification not innovation.
North Carolina wildlife management programs should feel the
impact of Hughes. The basis of North Carolina's wildlife regula-
tions and caselaw is state ownership. Since Hughes overrules Geer,
1. Etling, Who Owns the Wildlife?, 3 ENVIRON. L. 23, 23 (1973).
2. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (game); Organ v. State, 56 Ark.
251, 19 S.W. 840 (1892) (fish).
3. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
4. Id. at 528.
5. Id.
6. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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North Carolina-to be addressed in the conclusion-will need to
follow a new theory espousing more federal involvement in state
wildlife programs.
THE CASE
Appellant William Hughes held a Texas license to operate a
commercial minnow business in Texas. An Oklahoma Game
Ranger arrested Hughes on a charge of violating an Oklahoma
statute by transporting from Oklahoma to Wichita Falls, Texas, a
load of natural minnows purchased from a minnow dealer licensed
to do business in Oklahoma.7 The statute allegedly violated
provides:
No person may transport or ship minnows for sale outside the
state which were seined or procured within the waters of this
state except that: 1. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit any
person from leaving the state possessing three (3) dozen or less
minnows; 2. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit sale and
shipment of minnows raised in a regularly licensed commercial
minnow hatchery.8
Hughes contended that section 4-115B was unconstitutional
because it was repugnant to the commerce clause; however, the
trial court rejected this defense, and Hughes was convicted and
fined.9 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the lower court stating:
The United States Supreme Court has held on numerous oc-
casions that the wild animals and fish within a state's border are,
as far as capable of ownership, owned by the state in its sovereign
capacity for the common benefit of all its people. Because of such
ownership, and in the exercise of its police power, the state may
7. Id. at 324.
8. OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, § 4-115B (Supp. 1978). OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, § 4-115C
and -115D provide:
A. No person may ship or transport minnows for sale into this state
from an outside source without having first procured a license for such
from the Director.
C. The fee for a license under this section shall be:
1. For residents, . . . $100.00.
2. For nonresidents, . . . $300.00.
D. Any person convicted of violating any provisions of this section shall
be punished by a fine of not less than . $100.00 nor more than ...
$200.
9. Id.
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regulate and control the taking, subsequent use and property
rights that may be acquired therein". . . Oklahoma law does not
prohibit commercial minnow hatcheries within her borders from
selling stock minnows to anyone, resident or nonresident, and
minnows purchased therefrom may be freely exported. However,
the law served to protect against the depletion of minnows in
Oklahoma's natural streams through commercial exportation. No
person is allowed to export natural minnows for sale outside of
Oklahoma. Such a prohibition is not repugnant to the commerce
clause.1
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Crim-
inal Appeals and expressly overruled Geer v. Connecticut. The
Oklahoma statute, section 4-115B, was held to be repugnant to
the commerce clause because it discriminated against interstate
commerce. 12
BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution is silent on the subject of own-
ership and management of wildlife. The tenth amendment, how-
ever, provides that "powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people."1 " Thus the power to regu-
late wildlife is left with the states or the people subject only to
such power as Congress may exercise in the regulation of com-
merce, foreign and domestic.1 4
The words of the commerce clause-"the Congress shall have
the power . . . to regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States""-reflect the conviction of its framers that, in order to
succeed, the new union would have to avoid the tendencies toward
economic Balkanization1 O that had plagued relations among the
10. Hughes v. State, 572 P.2d 573, 575 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (citing
LaCoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545 (1924), and Geer v. Con-
necticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)).
11. Hughes v. State, 572 P.2d 573, 575 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
12. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 (1979).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
14. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 258 (1891) (coastal fisheries).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
16. Balkanization is the splitting of a territory into smaller ineffectual and
frequently conflicting units. WEBSTER'S NEW 20TH CENTURY DICTIONARY 142 (2d
ed. 1978).
19801
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colonies.17 Justice Cardoza discussed this conviction in Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.:'8 "[T]he Constitution was framed upon the
theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division."'19
The commerce clause is one of the most prolific sources of na-
tional power as well as a main cause of conflict with state legisla-
tion. 0 While the Constitution vests in Congress the power to regu-
late commerce among the states, it does not say what the states
may or may not do in the absence of congressional action, nor does
it define what is or is not commerce among the states.21 Cases de-
fining the scope of permissible state regulation in areas of congres-
sional silence exhibit a controversial and inconsistent evolution of
rules to accomodate federal and state interests.22 The regulation
and control of wildlife is one such controversial area between the
federal and state government.
Corfield v. Coryell,23 decided in 1823, was the first pronounce-
ment of the proprietary interest or state ownership doctrine by the
courts.2 The Circuit Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
had to decide whether or not a New Jersey law which prohibited
certain non-residents from gathering oysters in the state waters
was repugnant to the Constitution. The Court stated that the
property rights of "fishing" belong to all the citizens or subjects of
the state.
It is the property of all; to be enjoyed by them in subordination
to the laws which regulate its use .... [T]his right is a right of
property, vested either in certain individuals, or in the state for
the use of the citizens thereof. . .The oyster beds belonging to a
state may be abundantly sufficient for the use of the citizens of
that state, but might be totally exhausted and destroyed if the
legislature could not so regulate the use of them as to exclude the
17. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
18. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
19. Id. at 523.
20. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534 (1949).
21. Id. at 534-35.
22. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 398 U.S. 137 (1970); Southern Pac.
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (12 How. 1851); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9
Wheat. 1824).
23. 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
24. 38 GEO. L.J. 652, 654 (1950).
[Vol. 2:151
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citizens of the other states from taking them, except under such
limitations and restrictions as the laws may prescribe."'
In 1877 the United States Supreme Court examined a state's
property interest in oyster fisheries in McCready v. Virginia.2 6 The
Court reaffirmed the principle that each state owns the beds of all
tidewaters within its jurisdiction unless they have been divested.
The Court added that "the States own the tidewaters themselves,
and the fish in them so far as they are capable of ownership while
running. For this purpose the state represents its people, and the
ownership is that of the people in their united sovereignty. 2 7 The
holding was that this matter did not affect the power of Congress
to regulate commerce because commerce has "nothing to do with
land while producing, but only with the product after it has be-
come the subject of trade.""
Decided in 1896, Geer v. Connecticut2 9 involved a statute that
forbade the transportation beyond the state of game birds that had
been killed lawfully within the state. The statute was sustained
against a commerce clause challenge on the ground that no inter-
state commerce was involved. The United States Supreme Court
held that the state control over animals ferae naturae extended far
enough to permit regulation and control over their capture and
transportation out of the state because: (1) such animal resources
were the common property of all the citizens, (2) the state govern-
ment could administer the resources as a trust for the citizens and
(3) the state's police power extended to protection and conserva-
tion of this food source. 0 Mr. Justice Field, dissenting, objected to
the Court's analysis of "ownership" and "commerce" in wild
game3 1 and maintained:
When any animal, whether living in the waters . . .or in the air
... is lawfully killed for the purposes of food or other uses of
man, it becomes an article of commerce, and its use cannot be
limited in the citizens of one state to the exclusion of citizens of
another state . . . I do not doubt the right of the State, by its
legislation, to provide for the protection of wild game, so far as
25. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
26. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
27. Id. at 394.
28. Id. at 396.
29. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
30. Id. at 533-34; 35 W. VA. L. QUARTERLY 182, 183 (1928-29).
31. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 535-42 (1896).
1980]
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such protection is necessary for their preservation or for the com-
fort, health, or security of its citizens, and does not contravene
the power of Congress."2
Geer's dissenting view increasingly prevailed in many subse-
quent cases. Geer's majority analysis was rejected with respect to
natural resources other than wild game."8 The state of Indiana un-
successfully attempted, by analogy to the game cases, to reserve to
their citizens the state's power to regulate oil and gas resources.
The U.S. Supreme Court distinguished the two areas on the basis
that no common property right existed in the oil and gas such as
that which people had in natural game resources."4 Holding that a
state could prohibit a property owner from waste of the under-
ground mineral pool,385 the Court recognized an analogy between
animals ferae naturae and the moving deposits of oil and gas but
stated that no identity existed between the two. It reasoned that
with ferae naturae everyone has power to reduce a portion of the
public property to the domain of private ownership by reducing
the ferae naturae to possession; however, with natural gas and oil,
no such right exists in the public. It is vested only in the owners in
fee of the surface of the earth above the gas field.3" West v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co. overturned an Oklahoma statutory scheme which
prohibited out-of-state shipments of the state's natural gas. 7 De-
cided in 1911-only fifteen years after Geer-the Court reasoned
that if a state could prefer its own economic well-being to that of
the nation as a whole, "Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the
Northwest its timber [and] the mining States their minerals,"3 8 re-
sulting in a halt of commerce at state lines. Although Oklahoma
stressed the limited supply of gas and the need to conserve gas for
its own citizens, the Court firmly held that the statute violated the
commerce clause.3 9
32. Id. at 538-41.
33. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900) (oil and gas).
34. Id. at 202-03.
35. Id. at 210.
36. Id. at 209.
37. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
38. Id. at 255.
39. Id. The West analysis controlled in subsequent challenges to state regula-
tion of exports of natural resources of oil and gas. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553 (1923), involved a West Virginia statute which required natural gas
companies within the state to satisfy all fuel needs of West Virginia residents
before transporting any natural gas out of the state. This statute violated the
[Vol. 2:151
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With respect to the regulation and control of wild animals, the
Geer analysis that a state has power over wild animals began erod-
ing in 1920 with Missouri v. Holland.40 Missouri brought suit to
enjoin a United States game warden from attempting to enforce
the Migratory Bird Treaty on the ground that it interfered with
the state's reserved rights to control wild animals. The Court up-
held the Act as a proper exercise of the nation's treaty-making
power and further criticized the state ownership theory: "To put
the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed.
Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is
the beginning of ownership.
41
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel42 further eroded the
Geer decision's significance. Decided in 1928, the Court faced a
challenge to a Louisiana "Shrimp Act" which declared shrimp in
state waters to be the property of the state.48 The Act granted the
right to take and process shrimp to residents and to in-state
processing facilities and prohibited the exportation of shrimp from
which the heads and hulls had not been removed. Shrimp process-
ing facilities were at the time concentrated in Mississippi, and the
Court interpreted the silent purpose of the Act to be the develop-
ment of shrimp processing facilities in Louisiana." The shrimp
heads and hulls had some value as fertilizer base, and the Act per-
mitted exportation of this fertilizer; therefore, the Act proposed to
compel only the canning of shrimp and the manufacture of ferti-
lizer within Louisiana. 5 In support of the statute, the appellee
contended that the state owns all animals ferae naturae not re-
duced to possession, and the state may withdraw them from inter-
state commerce entirely or admit them strictly on the condition
that they first be canned.4 The Court rejected this reasoning and
held that the statute was unconstitutional as operating to obstruct
and burden interstate commerce. By permitting the taking of
shrimp for sale in interstate commerce, the state released its own-
commerce clause because it directly interfered with interstate commerce.
40. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
41. Id. at 434.
42. 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
43. Id. at 57.
44. Id. at 10; Barnett, The Constitution and State Powers of Export Limita-
tion, 13 TULSA L.J. 229, 246 (1977-78). *
45. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 8 (1928); 14 CORNELL
L.J. 245, 246 (1928-29).
46. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. at 11 (1928).
19801
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ership, ended the trusts on which it held title for the benefit of the
citizens and made the shrimp private property. 7 The subsidizing
of the Louisiana canning industry at the expense of the successful
Mississippi industry was not a legitimate exercise of state police
power over private property.48 The Court distinguished Geer on
the basis that "no part of the game was permitted by the Statute
to become an article of interstate commerce. '49 Thus, the interpre-
tation of Foster-Fountain Packing Co. appeared to be that if the
state owns or controls a resource, it may require the confinement
of distribution within the state for the purpose of consumption by
state residents but not for the limited purpose of promoting its
processing.50 "The restriction on exportation must be an all-or-
none proposition; it cannot be limited only to the point where the
resource is processed into a finished product but must extend to
the ultimate consumption of the resource." 51
The shift away from Geer's "state ownership" analysis became
more pronounced in Toomer v. Witsell,5 a 1948 case involving a
South Carolina statute which discriminated against out-of-state
fishermen. South Carolina required the payment of a fee for a li-
cense to engage in commercial shrimp fishing in a three-mile belt
extending off the South Carolina coast. The fee was $25 for a
shrimp boat owned by a South Carolina resident and $2500 for a
boat owned by a nonresident. Holding that the statute violated the
commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause, the
Court stated that the ownership theory was just a weak prop for
the discriminatory law.53 The Court discarded the concept of
"ownership" and described the doctrine as a "fiction" which states
utilized to express their power to preserve and regulate the ex-
ploitation of natural resources.54 The importance of the decision
was that even though a state may have plenary authority over its
wildlife, it cannot disregard or circumvent the authority of the
commerce clause where it permits its fish to be placed in the
47. Id. at 13.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 12.
50. Id.
51. Barnett, The Constitution and State Powers of Export Limitation, 13
TULSA L.J. 229, 247 (1977-78).
52. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 402.
[Vol. 2:151
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stream of interstate commerce."'
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commissions," decided the same
day as Toomer, involved a California statute which prohibited the
issuance of commercial fishing licenses to "any persons ineligible to
citizenship. 5 7 Plaintiff, a Japanese-born resident of California who
was ineligible for citizenship under federal naturalization laws,
sued to compel defendant to issue him a commercial fishing li-
cense. The statute was declared invalid under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court held that a state
could not discriminate in the granting of fishing licenses between
aliens and citizens because the power to regulate aliens was vested
in Congress.58 The ownership theory was repudiated further:
To whatever extent the fish in the three-mile belt off Califor-
nia may be "capable of ownership" by California, we think that
"ownership" is inadequate to justify California in excluding any
or all aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a
living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting all
others to do so.5
In New Mexico State Game Commission v. Udall," the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held in 1969 that officials of the Depart-
ment of the Interior had authority to destroy deer within the
Carlsbad Caverns National Park for a research study in deer popu-
lation control. The federal officials did not need the authorization
from the State Game Commission which usually was needed by or-
dinary landholders. Since the results of the study were to be used
to implement programs to prevent depredation of public lands, the
Secretary of the Interior was acting within his authority to have
the deer killed.6 1 This decision was similiar to an earlier case, Hunt
v. United States,6" where the Court upheld the killing of deer on
the Grand Canyon National Game Reserve by Federal District
Foresters acting under authority of the Secretary of Agriculture
because the overpopulated deer were damaging foliage in federal
55. Etling, supra note 1, at 28.
56. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
57. Id. at 413.
58. Id. at 420.
59. Id. at 421.
60. 281 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1968), rev'd, 410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir.), motion
for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied, 396 U.S. 953, cert. denied,
396 U.S. 961 (1969).
61. Id.
62. 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
1980]
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parks and were dying anyway due to insufficient foliage.
State control over game animals was undermined further in
Kleppe v. New Mexico," a 1976 case involving The Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act which was designed to protect "all
unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of the
United States." The New Mexico livestock Board had entered on
public land of the United States, removed wild burros therefrom
and sold them at public auction. The Bureau of Land Management
asserted authority under the Act and demanded that the Board
recover the animals and return them to public lands. The state of
New Mexico, the Board and the purchasers of the burros sought to
declare the Act unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court upheld
its validity as a proper exercise of congressional power under the
property clause of the Constitution.' Although the Court refrained
from deciding the constitutionality of the Act as it applied to wild
horses and burros on private land, the expansion of federal power
under the property clause substantially curtailed state authority to
enact general welfare laws pertaining to private lands nearby or
adjoining public lands.
Douglas v. Seacoast Products 5 a 1977 case, again supported
the Geer dissent. Virginia statutes which limited the right of non-
residents to catch fish in Virginia's territorial waters and limited
the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to United States citi-
zens were rejected because federal law preempted them and they
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment." The Court rejected Virginia's argument that because the
State has a title or ownership interest in the fish swimming in its
territorial waters, it can exclude federal licenses.67 Embracing the
analysis of the Geer dissenters, the Court stated:
A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a
private game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of "owning"
wild fish, birds or animals. Neither the states nor the Federal
Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter has
title to these creatures until they are reduced to possession by
skillful capture .... Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 539-540
(1896) (Field, J., dissenting). The "ownership" language of cases
such as those cited by appellant must be understood as no more
63. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
64. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
65. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
66. Id.
67. Id.
[Vol. 2:151
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than a 19th century legal fiction expressing "the importance to its
people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the ex-
ploitation of an important resource." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.,
at 402 see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S.
410 (1948). Under modern analysis, the question is simply
whether the state has exercised its police power in conformity
with the federal laws and Constitution.
68
ANALYSIS
Hughes v. Oklahoma6 9 is the first case to present facts "essen-
tially on all fours with Geer.' ' 70 The Court stripped the wildlife
"ownership title" from the states by basing its decision on a his-
tory of cases which undercut and eroded the Geer theory that a
state, as representative for. its citizens, owned all wildlife in the
state: West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 7 1 weakened Geer by hold-
ing that a statute which prohibited out-of-state shipment of natu-
ral gas violated the commerce clause; Missouri v. Holland,7 2 Fos-
ter-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydels and Toomer v. Witsell,7 4
involving migratory birds, shrimp and commercial fishermen, re-
spectively. Although the Geer theory of state ownership of wild an-
imals has been eroding since 1911,"5 Hughes expressly overruled
Geer and officially extinguished the ownership theory. Courts now
should consider challenges to state regulation and control of wild
animals under the commerce clause by the same general rule ap-
plied to state regulations of other natural resources. The general
rule for determining the validity of state statutes affecting inter-
state commerce is that "where the statute regulates evenhandedly
to effectuate a legitimate public interest, and its effects on inter-
state commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefit. '7 6 The question becomes one of de-
gree if a legitimate purpose exists; the extent that the burden is
tolerable will depend on the nature of the local interest involved
68. Id. at 284.
69. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
70. Id. at 335.
71. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
72. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
73. 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
74. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
75. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329 (1979).
76. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
1980]
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and any suitable alternatives with a lesser impact on interstate ac-
tivities.77 The party challenging the validity of the statute has the
burden to show discrimination; but "when discrimination against
commerce is demonstrated the burden falls on the State to justify
it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and
the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to
preserve the local interests at stake. T7 The Court in Hughes rea-
soned that, by overruling Geer, the analytical framework would be
brought into conformity with practical realities, the anomaly that
statutes imposing the most extreme burdens on interstate com-
merce were the most immune from challenge would be eliminated
and legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of
wild animals underlying the nineteenth century state ownership
theory would be protected. 9
The Court addressed the issue of whether or not the burden
imposed on interstate commerce by the Oklahoma statute section
4-115B was permissible under the general rule articulated in the
precedents governing other types of commerce. Under that general
rule the Court must examine (1) whether the challenged statute
regulated evenhandedly with only "incidental" effects on interstate
commerce or discriminates against interstate commerce, either on
its face or in practical effect; (2) whether or not the statute served
a legitimate local purpose and, if so, (3) whether or not alternative
means could promote this local purpose as well without discrimi-
nating against interstate commerce.80 Using this general rule, the
Hughes Court held that the Oklahoma statute discriminated
against interstate commerce on its face by forbidding the transpor-
tation of natural minnows out of the state and that this discrimi-
nation invoked the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate
local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives. 81 Oklahoma claimed that section 4-115B served a legitimate
local purpose as a conservation measure. Although the Court rec-
ognized a state's interests in wildlife conservation, it stressed that
a state could no longer keep its wildlife solely within its jurisdic-
tion for every purpose. The Court decided that other equally effec-
tive nondiscriminatory conservation measures were available in
77. Id.
78. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353
(1977).
79. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 335-36 (1979).
80. Id. at 336.
81. Id. at 336-37.
162 [Vol. 2:151
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which Oklahoma could conserve its minnows. Instead, Oklahoma
chose the most discriminatory way. Oklahoma neither limited the
number of minnows that licensed minnow dealers could take nor
controlled the disposal or distribution of minnows within the state.
Looking at the statute in its entirety, the Court viewed it as a
choice of the most discriminatory means to protect wildlife when
other nondiscriminatory alternatives were likely to fulfill the
State's legitimate local purpose more effectively.2
Under modern analysis, the question is whether the state has
execised its police power in conformity with the Constitution and
federal statutes.83 Pursuant to its police power, a state may pre-
scribe regulations to protect its citizens against harm to their
health, safety or welfare. Regulations pursuant to police powers
may not promote the state's economic welfare by burdening or
constricting the flow of interstate commerce." The Hughes Court
recognized that the State's interest in conservation and protection
of wildlife is a legitimate local purpose similar to the State's inter-
ests to protect the health and safety of its people under its police
power.8 5 The overruling of Geer does not leave states powerless to
protect and conserve wild animals within their borders. Hughes v.
Oklahoma makes clear that a state may promote this legitimate
purpose only in ways consistent with the basic principles that
"[olur economic unit is the Nation"' 6 and that when a wild animal
"becomes an article of commerce .. . its use cannot be limited to
the citizens of one State to the exclusion of citizens of another
State. '87 However, the means chosen by the State in Hughes were
discriminatory when the nondiscriminatory alternatives existed
which would have fulfilled the State's legitimate local purpose
more effectively. 8
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dis-
agreed with the majority in a dissenting opinion. 9 Although they
agreed that a state does not "own" the wild animals within its bor-
der in any conventional sense, they felt that Geer should not have
82. Id. at 338.
83. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977).
84. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
85. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 337.
86. Id. at 339 (citing H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537
(1949)).
87. Id. (citing Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 538 (1896)).
88. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 338.
89. Id. at 339.
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been overruled because of the important concepts it embodied.
They believed that the ownership language of Geer was a "short-
hand" way of describing the substantial interest a state has in pre-
serving and regulating the exploitation of wildlife resources within
its border for the benefit of its citizens.90 A state's interest in pro-
tecting its wildlife is not absolute; but short of conflicting with the
Constitution, a federal statute or a treaty, it should prevail. The
dissenters expressed the view that Oklahoma's statute although
"not the most artfully designed,"9 1 did not discriminate against
out-of-state enterprises or burden interstate commerce. The stat-
ute was evenhanded in its application-no person, resident or non-
resident was allowed to export natural minnows for sale outside of
Oklahoma. Interstate commerce was not blocked because anyone
freely could export an unlimited amount of minnows as long as the
minnows were hatchery minnows and not naturally seined min-
nows. The dissenters felt the statute adequately served the special
interest of the State "to protect against the depletion of minnows
in Oklahoma's natural streams through commercial exportation."9 2
The State's interest in wildlife conservation and preservation sub-
stantially outweighed any minimal burden of requiring hatchery
minnows for exportation.
CONCLUSION
All of the cases concerning wildlife ownership clearly demon-
strate that the federal government has a definite preeminence over
the states in the control and management of wildlife. Under article
II, section 2, of the United States Constitution, the federal govern-
ment has treaty-making powers over migratory birds, fish and
wildlife. The federal government under article I, section 8, and
amendment IV, section 1 of the Constitution has power to prevent
state discrimination to immigrants and aliens. Under the property
clause, the federal government has power not only to make ecologi-
cal studies of but also to destroy wildlife that may be detrimental
to federal lands. Finally, the federal government under article I,
section 8 of the Constitution has power to regulate interstate com-
merce and to prevent state discrimination against citizens of other
states in relation thereto.
90. Id. at 341-42.
91. Id. at 343.
92. Id. (citing Hughes v. State, 572 P.2d 573, 575 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977)).
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A 1942 case" illustrated the reach of the commerce clause in
this area and suggested the clause gave Congress the authority to
ban discrimination against nonresidents by states seeking to retain
authority over their wild animals. A federal statute which estab-
lished quotas for the amount of wheat grown by individual farmers
was at issue. The Court applied the statute to a farmer who ex-
ceeded his quota and concluded that the excess wheat produced,
though it might be consumed on the premises, seriously could
damage interstate commerce.94 By producing only for his own
needs, the individual reduced the amount of wheat that would
otherwise flow in interstate commerce; therefore, the commerce
clause permitted Congress to regulate the amount of wheat
grown.95 If prohibiting excess production were justified because in-
terstate commerce was affected, prohibiting states from discourag-
ing sales to nonresidents also would seem justified."
The overruling of Geer clearly designates the federal govern-
ment as "boss" in wildlife control and management. Although fed-
eral interference with every aspect of a state's regulation of wild
animals is unlikely, the essence of the Hughes decision is that the
federal government completely could eclipse the state if it wished.
Freedom to state authorities to make decisions concerning wildlife
management may be hampered due to potential increased federal
involvement and control over state internal wildlife regulation poli-
cies. States can no longer reserve their wildlife exclusively for the
benefit of their own citizens. State conservation plans may need
the approval of the federal government as will plans regulating
such activities as hunting, trapping and fishing.
Many states attempt to limit the exportation of their raw
materials and wildlife by claiming that an inadequate supply
would jeopardize the abilities of the states' economies to produce
sufficient goods and to provide sufficient employment.9 7 A similar
threat from inadequate energy supplies led Congress in 1973 to
adopt the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act.99 This Act re-
quired the President to impose mandatory measures to allocate pe-
troleum and expressly preempted any conflicting allocation pro-
93. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
94. Id.
95. Barnett, The Constitution and State Powers of Export Limitation, 13
TULSA L.J. 229, 253 (1977-78).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 254.
98. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-754 (Supp. V 1975).
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gram established by a state. 9" Courts have upheld the Act under
the commerce clause and other constitutional challenges 10"
A 1978 case reflects the problems a state will encounter in reg-
ulating its natural resources. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey10 '
involved a New Jersey statute which prohibited the importation of
most solid or liquid waste collected outside the State border. Pri-
vate New Jersey landfills and several cities in other states chal-
lenged this statute on various state and federal grounds. The
United States Supreme Court held that, even though the state
statute was not preempted by federal law, it violated the commerce
clause. The Court rejected New Jersey's argument that it was run-
ning out of land to use for the disposal of waste and that the dis-
posal of waste from out of state threatened the quality of the New
Jersey environment.'02 The State cannot prevent privately owned
articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate com-
merce on the ground that local demands or people of the state
need it. 03 The Court gave little credence to New Jersey's claims of
health hazards posed by the extra volume of waste from out of the
State but was impressed more by the fact that all states share the
waste disposal problem.10 4 The Court's decision means that no
state can prevent others from sharing its natural resource of waste
disposal sites, even though it is a resource which does not move in
interstate commerce. 1' 5
Significant change in the management of marine fisheries may
occur due to the passage of the Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act of 1976 (FCMA) 0 6 and the Hughes decision. FCMA es-
tablished a 197-mile exclusive fisheries conservation zone contigu-
ous to the three-mile territorial sea and created eight Regional
Fisheries Management Councils to prepare and implement fishery
management plans for all fisheries within their jurisdictions. 0 7 By
the Act, Congress has attempted to conserve and to regulate the
99. Barnett, supra note 44, at 254.
100. Id.
101. 437 U.S. 167 (1978).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 18 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 925, 931 (1978).
105. Id.
106. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (Supp. 1977).
107. Schoenbaum & McDonald, State Management of Marine Fisheries Af-
ter the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 and Douglas v. Sea-
coast Products, Inc., 19 W.&M.L. REV. 1, 29 (1977-78).
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domestic fishing industry; it advances these goals by establishing a
framework within which the federal government may secure con-
trol over foreign fishing vessels in American waters, promoting the
conservation of fishery resources and inducing the replenishment
of depleted, over-exploited fishery stocks. 0 8
Similarly, Hughes v. Oklahoma may restrict state marine
fishery laws. To highlight the imminent changes in state manage-
ment of marine fisheries because of these recent developments, a
look at North Carolina's laws and regulations may help focus the
discussion.
North Carolina long has held that the ownership of wildlife is
vested in the state. State v. Gallop,'09 decided in 1900, affirmed
the principles that the ownership of game is in the people of the
state and that the legislature has the power to withhold or grant to
individuals the right to hunt and kill game." '0
So well recognized is it that the ownership of game and fish is
in the State and not in individuals, that the decisions are uniform
that a State may confer exclusive right of fishing and hunting
upon its citizens, and expressly exclude nonresidents, without in-
fringing that provision of the Constitution of the United States
(Art. IV, Sec. 2) ... and may impose higher penalties on nonresi-
dents who violate the game laws than on residents....
Indeed, so completely is the ownership of public water in the
State ... that the State can absolutely forbid the use of its wa-
ters for fishing or planting oysters by nonresidents .. ., and of
course for hunting purposes. And the State may forbid the trans-
portation of dead game beyond its borders, or killing or having it
in possession for that purpose."'
This state ownership theory continued to be expressed in North
Carolina wildlife cases," 2 although it began to follow the trend of
erosion similar to the U.S. Supreme Court cases on wildlife." 8 As
recent as April, 1979, the Court of Appeals reiterated the proposi-
tion that "the State's wildlife population is a natural resource of
the State held by it in trust for its citizens, the enactment of laws
108. Id. at 1.
109. 126 N.C. 979, 35 S.E. 180 (1900).
110. Id. at 982, 35 S.E. at 181.
111. Id. at 983-84, 35 S.E. at 182.
112. State v. Barkley, 192 N.C. 184, 134 S.E. 454 (1926); Moore v. Bell, 191
N.C. 305, 131 S.E. 724 (1926); Daniels v. Homer, 139 N.C. 219, 51 S.E. 992 (1905).
113. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources
Comm'n, 588 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978).
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reasonably related to the protection of such wildlife constitutes a
valid exercise of the police power vested in the General
Assembly."" 4
This background of North Carolina's participation in the state
ownership theory makes the philosophy behind the laws and regu-
lations of North Carolina fisheries resources easier to understand.
Marine fishing is an important industry in North Carolina."" Pres-
ently, by statute, the marine and estuarine resources of North Car-
olina belong to all the people of the state. 16 The Division of
Marine Fisheries, an agency within the Department of Natural Re-
sources and Community Development, is charged with the stew-
ardship of the marine and estuarine resources of the state and thus
is responsible for the maintenance, preservation, protection and
development of all these resources." 7 The Marine Fisheries Com-
mission is the rulemaking body of the division and is responsible
for establishing policy and promulgating rules." 8 The fifteen-mem-
ber Commission (appointed by the governor) imposes gear restric-
tions, area and seasonal requirements and limitations on methods
of taking, amount and fish size. Geographically, North Carolina
law asserts jurisdiction over a zone extending two-hundred miles
from the coastline." 9
Additional regulations of fisheries are achieved through vari-
ous license, permit and lease requirements for certain categories of
users of the resource.' Vessels engaged in commercial fishing
must obtain a commercial fishing license.' 2' The fees for residents
are nominal, ranging from one dollar for boats without motors to
114. State v. Stewart, 40 N.C. App. 693, 695, 253 S.E.2d 638, 640 (1979).
115. The dockside value of North Carolina's commercial fisheries in 1978 to-
taled $41.6 million (compared to $9.5 million in 1965). The major commercial spe-
cies in North Carolina are shrimp, blue crabs, hard clams, oysters, sea scallops,
striped bass, flounder, spot, grey trout, menhaden and river herring. Other species
contributing to the commercial landings in 1978 include American eel (a new re-
cord of 700,000 lbs.), snapper and grouper, scup and porgies, shad and white
perch (498,000 lbs., the best in over 20 years). M. Street, Trends in North Caro-
lina's Commercial Fisheries, 1965-1978 (February 1, 1979) (may be obtained from
Division of Marine Fisheries, N.C. Dept. of Natural Resources and Community
Development).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-131 (1975).
117. 15 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 3.0002.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-151 (1975).
119. Id. § 113-134.1.
120. Schoenbaum & McDonald, supra note 107, at 34.
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-152(a)(1) (1975).
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seventy-five cents per foot for vessels over twenty-six feet in
length;122 however, nonresidents of North Carolina must pay two-
hundred dollars for each ship licensed, regardless of its length. 2
All persons taking oysters and clams from state waters for com-
mercial purposes also must get a license. 124 This license costs one
dollar and is limited to state residents.125 To promote commercial
cultivation of oysters and clams, the Commission leases to state
residents portions of the public seabeds underlying the coastal
fishing waters that already do not have natural clam or oyster
beds.'26
Probably the major impact on North Carolina's fishery man-
agement will be a sharp curtailment of the freedom of action exer-
cised by the Marine Fisheries Commission, which traditionally has
exercised unlimited discretion in substantive management mat-
ters. 2 7 The FCMA preempts this extensive claim of jurisdiction. 2
Except for fisheries wholly within State waters, the Commission
may be compelled to follow the lead of the Regional Councils when
promulgating its management regulations.12 9
The State may be required to change the quality of its fishing
programs in addition to coordinating seasonal, equipment and
other management restrictions with the Council's plan. 30 The Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service and other federal authorities prob-
ably will encourage the comprehensive management of each fishery
and may promote the adoption of limited-entry programs.'3 ' These
programs would curtail access to fisheries by restricting the availa-
bility of licenses, establishing quotas and imposing high entry fees
to discourage all but the most economically efficient outfits. 3 2
FCMA has given the Councils power to adopt the limited-entry
program; and as the need to conserve fishing resources increases,
the elements of the limited-entry alternative may be receiving
more attention.
122. See id. § 113-152(c)(l)-(4).
123. Id. § 113-152(c)(4a) (1978).
124. Id. § 113-154(a) (1975).
125. Id. § 113-154(c).
126. Id. § 113-229 to -230.
127. Schoenbaum & McDonald, supra note 107, at 37.
128. Id. at 34.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 38.
132. Id.
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Regardless of whether or not the limited-entry system is im-
plemented, North Carolina must employ a more comprehensive
system of regulation. 8 ' No license requirement exists for saltwater
sports and recreational fishermen; therefore, little data is known
concerning the species and amount of their catches.13 4 Also, the
federal authorities may require North Carolina to integrate the
regulation of its marshland and wetland resources with its fisheries
management program and to establish a more adequate plan for
controlling coastal pollution. 13
One of the more serious problems with North Carolina's
fishery management program is its discrimination against nonresi-
dents. "1 6 Judging by the Supreme Court's standards as enumerated
in Hughes, North Carolina's discriminatory practices are unconsti-
tutional. 37 The new federal standards should force North Caro-
lina's fishermen to share the state's fisheries with nonresidents, but
the new requirements also should grant North Carolina residents
access to the resources of other states." 8
The underlying policy of all prior North Carolina cases con-
cerning ownership of wildlife will have to change. " 9 The fact that
the North Carolina state government does not own its wildlife will
be reflected in future wildlife resources litigation; state ownership
no longer can be a controlling factor in granting state's power to
manage wildlife. Challenges to state environmental legislation
under the commerce clause involve a conflict of value judgments
between the state and federal government, each of which seeks to
promote legitimate interests. The commerce clause is designed to
protect the natural interest in free trade while the state environ-
mentalists generally design legislation to promote health and wel-
fare. " 0 When these state and federal interests collide, the first im-
pulse is to hold that the federal interest overpowers the state
133. Id. at 39.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 40.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 40-41.
139. State v. Barkley, 192 N.C. 184, 134 S.E. 449 (1926); Moore v. Bell, 191
N.C. 305, 131 S.E. 724 (1926); Daniels v. Homer, 139 N.C. 219, 51 S.E. 992 (1905);
State v. Gallop, 126 N.C. 979, 35 S.E. 180 (1900); State v. Stewart, 40 N.C. App.
693, 253 S.E.2d 638 (1979).
140. K. Sisk, State Environmental Protection v. The Commerce Power, 13
U. RICH. L. REV. 197 (1979).
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interest under the supremacy clause. In many ways, however, this
result may not be the best solution. States differ from one another
with respect to geographical and meteorological conditions as well
as the degree of man's despoilation of the environment.141 This va-
riety supports the appropriateness of local rather than federal reg-
ulation.1 4 2 Also, the people who live in a particular area are inter-
ested more directly in their surroundings than the "natural body
politic." 43 The nation too easily can disregard the interests of the
local people of a given area because certain laws may have a more
drastic effect on the local environment than on the nation as a
whole, and any harm suffered by the local environment does not
directly affect people nationally with the impact it has on local re-
sidents.14 4 Wildlife found in the several states is so diverse that a
single federal body could not establish a rational system of regula-
tion."15 "It would not be reasonable to assume that Congress could
enact legislation well-suited to the regulation of the fish of the
New England streams, the reptiles of the southern swamps, the
predators of the midwestern plains, and the big game of the Rocky
Mountains. '1 46
The court, as final arbitrator, will have to weigh the conflicting
interests carefully and arrive at the fair result. The United States
Supreme Court uses a verbal formulation of the balancing test that
indicates that state regulation will be upheld unless the burdens to
commerce outweigh the local benefits;"47 however, a real danger is
application of the balancing test without proper consideration of
environmental concerns and local problems. All too easily the char-
acteristics and differences of a locale could become "forgotten" in
weighing the interests involved, especially when deciding without
properly researching the actual benefits and burdens involved. The
balancing test must be infused with substantial content that ade-
quately reflects the nature and weight of state interests in environ-
mental cases if courts are to attain a workable and meaningful allo-
cation of powers between state and federal governments in the
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Note, Expansion of National Power Under the Property Clause: Fed-
eral Regulation of Wildlife. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 7 LAND AND WATER L. REV.
181 (1977).
146. Id. at 189.
147. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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field of wildlife regulation. " s
A state's interest in conservation and protection of wild ani-
mals is a legitimate local purpose similar to the state's interests in
the general health, safety and welfare of its citizens;" 9 however,
the legitimate state interests in conservation is narrower under the
Hughes analysis than it was in the Geer decision.150 A state can no
longer "keep property, if the sovereign so chooses, always within
its jurisdiction for every purpose."1 51 The state ownership theory
may no longer be used as the rationale to force those outside the
state to bear the full costs of "conserving" the wild animals within
its borders when equally effective nondiscriminatory conservation
methods are available. 52 Thus a state must conserve its wildlife in
a way that does not interfere with interstate commerce.
The critical variable is the degree of interference with inter-
state commerce because almost any phase of animal conservation
will affect or influence interstate commerce in some way. The test
of interstate commerce is not dependent on the application of such
labels as "production," "transportation," "internal" or "local":
rather the test is whether or not the activity has any effect on in-
terstate commerce. " ' Even commerce which is purely intrastate in
character may be regulated by Congress if the activity, when com-
bined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects com-
merce among the states or with foreign nations.
Susan Morrison Umstead
148. Note, supra note 73.
149. Fireman v. Chicago, R.J.&P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
150. 441 U.S. at 337.
151. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 530 (1896).
152. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
153. Barnett, The Constitution and State Powers of Export Limitation, 13
TULSA L.J. 229, 253 (1977-78).
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